The May 2000 Cerro Grande wildfire swept through Los Alamos, New Mexico, forcing evacuation of Los Alamos National Laboratory and the communities of Los Alamos and White Rock. Use of geographic information system (GIS) technology for emergency response and post-fire mitigation provided valuable lessons about institutional operations, working relationships, and emergency preparedness. These lessons include the importance of: 1) GIS as an integrating framework for hazard assessment; 2) having a strong GIS capability in place; 3) coordinated emergency plans among GIS facilities; 4) reliable methods for locating and informing evacuated employees; 5) GIS data that are complete, backed up, and available during an emergency; 6) adaptation of GIS to emergency circumstances; 7) coordination within the GIS community; 8) integration of GIS into institutional operations; and 9) centralized data and metadata.

IntroductIon
In recent years, geographic information system (GIS) technology has played an increasing role in emergency response. 1 GIS provides the means to organize key map-based data in a sophisticated relational database framework with advanced capabilities for analysis, visualization, and enterprise-level access. The primary function of any information system, including GIS, is the collection, storage, and analysis of data to improve the decision-making process. GIS uses data that are related to a geographic location in three dimensions, which defines a specific geospatial position. Geospatial data, such as buildings of various heights, highways, terrain features, and vegetation, can be depicted in a map-based context as data layers superimposed to reveal their spatial relationships.
GIS provides an efficient way to analyze large datasets for desired attributes or patterns and to portray the results on a map or other visualization method. This allows decision makers to see specific types of information in a complex collection of data. Many organizations, including Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), are learning to use GIS for institutional-level applications, such as emergency planning and response, rather than just for short-term, project-scale tasks. This broader type of use, called enterprise GIS, involves corporate and technical issues described in an article by Witkowski et al. 2 The challenge for emergency response teams is to have the appropriate data available to the right people at the right time. This study provides a basis for the effective use of GIS in organizational emergency response by documenting key events and GIS activities during and after the May 2000 Cerro Grande wildfire, which was the largest wildfire in New Mexico as of 2000. These events and GIS activities are analyzed to determine how they can be applied to emergency management situations in which GIS plays a role.
is about 18,000 people. The Laboratory stretches between Los Alamos and White Rock and consists of 28,654 acres (44.8 sq mi) of forested canyons and mesas, among which are scattered, isolated clusters of experimental facilities, explosive testing areas, and research laboratories. Over 10,000 employees, many who commute long distances, work for the Laboratory or its primary contractors.
Both of the communities and the Laboratory are situated on the Pajarito Plateau amid a fire-prone conifer forest, which also covers the adjacent mountains. A series of deep, vertical-walled canyons dissect the plateau's relatively flat surface so that Los Alamos and most of the Laboratory's facilities reside on long, finger-like mesas (Figure 2 ). Such irregular terrain restricts highway access. Also, the heavily forested, intervening canyons, which are in line with the direction of the prevailing wind, facilitate the rapid spread of fire. These are important factors with regard to evacuation and emergency response to forest fires that occasionally threaten the area, including the Cerro Grande wildfire.
Various factors played a role in the real and perceived risks during the wildfire. The Laboratory's research, which dates to the development of the first atomic bomb in the Manhattan Project of World War II, has long involved radioactive and hazardous materials. Because of this association with hazardous materials, certain locations are suspected of having potential contamination from past research activities. Called Potential Release Sites (PRSs), these locations are being studied to determine their need for environmental remediation. Fire or subsequent soil erosion could potentially disperse contaminants from these areas. About half of the Laboratory's land is devoted to testing that utilizes high explosives, which are stored in protected, fireproof bunkers. Also, certain facilities that handle nuclear materials must be protected from fire.
In the last several decades, forest fires in the region have grown in intensity due, in part, to the unnaturally dense vegetation and forest litter that have accumulated as a result of historical land management policies, which had emphasized vigorous fire suppression. Particularly, since the nearby Dome forest fire in 1996, the Laboratory has made an effort to control fire risk on its property by creating fuel breaks-zones where potential fuels, such as fallen trees, forest litter, and overly dense vegetation have been reduced.
Ironically, the most efficient method to reduce forest fuel seems to be the use of prescribed, controlled fires. 3 Since the 1980s, local forest managers of the US Forest Service (USFS) and US National Park Service (NPS) have set a series of small, controlled fires to try to manage the constant buildup of forest fuels. One such fire, unfortunately, began the catastrophic Cerro Grande wildfire in 2000, which was widely reported by the national and international news media because of its affect on the Laboratory. tHe emergency: tHe cerro grAnde wIldfIre On Thursday, May 4, 2000, NPS personnel at nearby Bandelier National Monument ignited a prescribed fire on Cerro Grande, a mountain 6 km (4 miles) southwest of Los Alamos. Prefire conditions were assessed by NPS personnel using standard protocols and were deemed to be appropriate for a controlled burn. 4 However, the fire had escaped its containment by the next day and began slowly advancing eastward, pushed by strong winds. When the LANL workforce departed for the weekend, the fire was not yet regarded as a serious problem. Consequently, the staff did not undertake many contingency measures.
By Sunday, May 7, the blaze was declared a wildfire, and it began spreading rapidly northeastward along the mountain slopes near LANL. Aircraft dropped fire-retardant slurry to stop numerous spot fires on LANL property caused by windblown embers, and the growing threat to Los Alamos led to precautionary evacuation of neighborhoods nearest the fire. The Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) for the Laboratory and for Los Alamos County, which were separate facilities at that time, were activated and the Laboratory area closest to the fire was evacuated in the afternoon. 5 Due to the rapidly increasing danger, LANL managers decided Sunday night, May 7, to close the Laboratory and to not allow the workforce to return Monday morning. This was a critical decision; subsequently, only emergency workers and security personnel were allowed at the Laboratory, which eliminated the possibility of employees returning to safeguard their facilities, equipment, and data.
Winds increased dramatically on Wednesday, May 10, and the fire crowned (reached treetops), allowing it to cross the last containment line and surge toward Los Alamos. This prompted a total evacuation of the city at 1:00 PM. In only four hours, 11,000 residents were safely evacuated, many to White Rock, where a Red Cross emergency shelter was set up in a church. By early evening, strong winds pushed a 37-meter (120-foot) high wall of flames into the west and north sides of Los Alamos (Figure 3 ), incinerating several hundred homes near the forest. 6 A firebreak along the west side of the Laboratory had, until this time, successfully prevented the fire from gaining a foothold on LANL property, but winddriven embers raining up to 1.6 km (1 mile) ahead of the fire soon caused spot fires to break out in this area. The spot fires developed into a second fire front that rapidly spread eastward across the Laboratory. 5 Wednesday evening, flames of the second fire front nearly overran the Laboratory's EOC, forcing most emergency managers to relocate to Laboratory offices in White Rock, toward which one fire front continued to advance. Meanwhile, the main fire spread rapidly northeastward into the mountains, prompting voluntary evacuations in nearby downwind communities.
After midnight, the fire threatened several Lab or atory facilities that contained nuclear materials, prompting a precautionary order to evacuate White Rock at 1:07 AM on Thursday, May 11. This caused Laboratory emergency management staff gathered there to relocate again, establishing a third EOC facility behind the fire front. Most of White Rock's 7,000 residents, joined by hundreds of evacuees from Los Alamos, were asleep at that hour and were caught off-guard by the emergency evacuation announcement. They experienced a hurried, nighttime departure that was much less orderly than had occurred in Los Alamos. Vehicles slowly departed on the sole remaining evacuation route in a bumper-tobumper traffic jam that lasted several hours.
The fire, though in close proximity, did not reach the Laboratory's highly protected nuclear facilities, and no radioactive releases occurred. Thus, the evacuating traffic and the community were never actually endangered by airborne radioactive contamination. Nevertheless, the decision to evacuate White Rock was justified because the fire soon spread to within 945 m (3,100 feet) of White Rock's departure route. 7 Fortunately, the community did not suffer fire damage, unlike Los Alamos.
Firefighters fought in darkness Thursday morning to save Los Alamos and many Laboratory facilities that were at risk from the fast-spreading fire. Gusts to 97 kph (60 mph) rained burning embers onto Los Alamos during the predawn hours, starting spot fires that completely destroyed some homes but spared others in the town's western neighborhoods. By Thursday afternoon, flames again approached the Laboratory's primary EOC, but, once more, they passed just yards away without damaging the building. The staff members who remained there, however, chose to relocate to the temporary EOC. The majority of Los Alamos County residents were allowed to return to their homes on May 15, but the Cerro Grande wildfire was not contained until June 6. The fire was finally declared extinguished on September 25, 2000.
regrouPIng tHe stAff
Most of the population of Los Alamos County was dispersed throughout northern New Mexico and surrounding states. The unexpected, total evacuation of the county (other than for emergency and security personnel) caused chaotic changes in plans for many people. Los Alamos residents who had chosen to stay with friends in White Rock were abruptly evacuated again in the middle of the night, with little time to make alternate arrangements or to inform anyone of their change of location.
Most people had little or no information about the whereabouts of neighbors and coworkers, though impromptu electronic bulletin boards, sign-up lists at local shelters, and online evacuee databases hosted by area news media were soon established. Some Los Alamos churches did relatively well at locating their members with sign-up lists at affiliated churches in Santa Fe. However, evacuees' knowledge of and ability to access the various lists was mixed, due to distance (which could be several hundred miles away), lack of computers and Internet access at their particular location, and the lack of information. These factors meant that regrouping of evacuated staff members from the Laboratory was uncommon and often serendipitous.
Key staff members gradually regained contact with each other using various methods. Those who lived outside the evacuation zone could be reached at home, but evacuees were usually not contacted because their locations were unknown. Those who happened to have personal cell phones could, in theory, be contacted-if the other party knew their phone numbers. However, such information was ordinarily kept at work or sometimes at home, neither of which were available to Los Alamos residents or most Laboratory employees due to the evacuation.
Several evacuated employees received instructions via their home telephone answering machines, which they checked remotely; others responded to official requests posted in the news media. A small number of key members of the Laboratory's Environ mental Restoration (ER) Project were consequently able to regroup in Santa Fe by Saturday, May 13, to begin support of emergency operations in Los Alamos.
gIs for emergency suPPort
There was public and official concern about whether any risk existed of airborne contamination from the Laboratory, which might be entrained in the heavy smoke that lay over the region and extended hundreds of miles downwind. Therefore, data about the location and constituents of PRSs in burned Laboratory areas were of immediate importance. The initial action to help answer this question was to deploy Laboratory and federal assets to monitor for contamination. No Laboratory produced contaminants were detected that posed a health threat (though wood smoke, itself, was a respiratory irritant). 8 Also needed was a way to display PRS contaminant data on maps of the fire.
One of the primary GIS facilities at the Laboratory was the Facility for Information Management and Display (FIMAD), now known as GISLab. FIMAD was the primary data repository and GIS resource for the Laboratory's ER Project, and its cartography staff produced over a thousand new maps each year. FIMAD was closed as a result of the Laboratory's shutdown, but since electrical power hadn't failed, its computer servers continued to function unattended. These servers were connected to the Laboratory's intranet, which also remained operational. These FIMAD servers proved crucial for offsite GIS efforts. 5 Prior to the fire, two employees had been assigned to work at home on ER Project tasks and happened to have copies of the basic geospatial data used by FIMAD, plus a copy of GIS software. Together, they had sufficient data for creating base maps of LANL and its PRSs. Their personally owned hardware, which included desktop computers, monitors, and network hubs and cables, formed the basis for creating a Local Area Network offsite.
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Unlike most other Laboratory GIS personnel, both of these employees lived outside the evacuation zone, enabling managers to contact them. Secondly, their Laboratory data and personal equipment were available to support the emergency. Evacuees, in contrast, carried only the possessions they had time and space to load into their vehicles. Due to pressing personal needs, evacuated employees ordinarily could not be considered as staffing resources until days later, even if their location was known. Therefore, GIS efforts during the emergency depended heavily on personnel who did not live in the affected area.
The data regarding constituents of affected PRSs resided on computers throughout the Laboratory that, in most cases, were inaccessible. These servers and desktop computers often had different operating systems and were on different networks. Data were stored in different formats; required different software; were of varying quality, completeness, and age; and required specific access permissions and passwords. Such difficulties meant that emergency managers could not easily access important institutional information or determine its reliability. 9 The EOC had to rely on its own, potentially outdated data until other sources became available, motivating the creation of an offsite GIS facility.
lAnl offsIte gIs fAcIlIty
The Environmental GIS (EGIS) office at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque volunteered to support DOE emergency response efforts and provided the initial GIS capability. They called upon members of the New Mexico Geographic Information Council (NMGIC) for regional GIS datasets, which Sandia staff used to create initial maps of the fire. The DOE Albuquerque EOC used these maps to make essential decisions about LANL assets that might be at risk. EGIS served primarily as a data-gathering and distribution node rather than as a cartography production shop, providing fire-perimeter data to the DOE field teams, who monitored for radiation and chemical releases in the LANL area. 5 GIS personnel from FIMAD were contacted on May 12, and enabled the linkage of mission concept, basic equipment, GIS expertise, geospatial data, and networking experience. They established an offsite GIS facility that day at the Santa Fe office of a graphics subcontractor for the ER Project. The GIS operation in Santa Fe initially involved a single personal computer and one copy of GIS software, but the subcontractor's computers, which used a different operating system, were soon pressed into service. Once hardware and software compatibility issues were resolved, the team created a local area network with an Internet node to provide e-mail capability and to allow the staff to reach the LANL network and FIMAD servers.
gIs oPerAtIonAl Procedures
Maps were printed at first on a large-format plotter at a local commercial copy center, but the only way to retain use of the plotter was to keep it in continuous operation. Since emergency maps were being generated day and night, staff members sometimes resorted to sending the same maps, even if they had already been printed, to maintain their place in the queue. This creative but rather inefficient procedure was eventually resolved by ordering a large-format plotter. The emergency situation required unique and expedited solutions to standard, sometimes lengthy, business procedures, such as convincing vendors to deliver Laboratory purchases to a different location than normal. Inventiveness, patience, and adaptability were keys to success for offsite operations.
Constantly updated maps were critical for Laboratory managers and firefighters. Location data about the rapidly changing fire were derived from infrared imagery taken during nightly flights by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). BLM staff digitized the imagery, which showed areas of active burning, to create geospatial polygon or line files. These were relayed each morning to the Sandia EGIS where they were converted to spatially referenced overlays of fire perimeters and hot spots on base maps of the Los Alamos area that had been provided by the USFS.
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Sandia staff then electronically transferred the map files to a server at Los Alamos or, in some cases, directly to the GIS facility in Santa Fe. These files were used to create hundreds of maps that showed burned areas in relation to PRSs-the potentially contaminated areas.
GIS efforts continued around-the-clock for 10 days to produce the maps. Staff was divided into shifts, which developed individual roles and responsibilities and quickly became very effective. Procedures were established for data management, cartography, printing, meals and refreshments, transportation, supplies, logistics; and coordination with Sandia and the laboratory's EOC ran efficiently and was adjusted as circumstances changed. Critical for such intense, sustained effort is the management of stress and fatigue.
Laboratory scientists soon recognized the threat posed by burned mountain slopes during the approaching summer thunderstorm season. Hills denuded of vegetation would allow rapid runoff of precipitation and, consequently, would pose a greater threat of flashfloods. There was an immediate need to model hydrological changes that might result in area canyons. A large rainstorm could threaten people, infrastructure, and the environment. Some of these scientists got permission to retrieve software and data from their Laboratory offices, which were close to active fires. This material enabled them to prepare hydrological models that revealed which areas were at potential risk from flooding or debris flows. The modeling results prompted the permanent closure of particularly threatened facilities.
use of gIs for Post-fIre remedIAtIon
The Laboratory remained closed until Monday, May 22, a shutdown unprecedented in its 57-year history. No major buildings were lost, but 28 percent of LANL land was burned and 112 small structures, road infrastructure, and numerous utility lines and signs were damaged or destroyed. In Los Alamos, 239 structures were burned and 429 families lost their homes. 6 The fire, fortunately, took no human lives, unlike the disastrous California wildfires of 2003.
No LANL GIS facilities were damaged or destroyed in the fire. Consequently, GIS staff members were able to return to provide immediate support to the multiagency Burned Area Emergency Rehabilitation (BAER) team that arrived to mitigate fire damage in the forests. The need for infrastructure information and burn-severity data increased dramatically as Laboratory and city managers began assessing hazards from potential flash floods, erosion, sedimentation, and mobilization of contaminants. Devastated mountainsides above Los Alamos not only had little remaining ground cover to hold rainwater, but the soil in places had become hydrophobic (water-repellent). In the months after the fire, considerable remediation was accomplished by the USFS, LANL, Los Alamos County workers, and hundreds of volunteers from the public. Planning and documentation of this work relied heavily on GIS.
The DOE initiated the Cerro Grande Rehabi li tation Project (CGRP) to coordinate restoration of damaged infrastructure and property at the Laboratory and mitigation of hazards resulting from the fire. Hazards included not only erosion and potential canyon flooding but the anticipated fall of tens of thousands of dead trees and the threat posed by enormous quantities of dead but still combustible wood in burned forests. These threats, the ongoing mitigation measures to counter them, the Laboratory-wide efforts to repair fire damage, and ongoing research of post-fire environmental changes have greatly increased the use of GIS at LANL. GIS was used in planning forest thinning, delineation of floodplain changes, upgrade of GIS capabilities for a new EOC, updated mapping of Laboratory infrastructure, and predictive fire modeling. The new EOC features a data mirror to automatically and regularly capture current datasets needed by emergency managers. Such activities have improved LANL disaster response capabilities. GIS analytical studies have helped decision makers define and significantly reduce the risk from future fires, floods, and other emergencies. The Cerro Grande wildfire taught many lessons with respect to use of GIS in emergencies, some that were immediately apparent and others that were evident only later upon reflection. These include large issues of institutional significance, some that relate to working relationships and others regarding details of emergency preparedness. The following lessons-learned have been gleaned from discussions with many of the participants of the Cerro Grande wildfire experience, personal observations, and from cited LANL documents. 5 
GIS provides an integrating framework for assessing natural hazards, security issues, and emergency response.
Only by viewing the institution within its geographical and ecological setting (in our case, a forested canyon area subject to wildfire) can emergency managers be fully aware of the interrelated factors that contribute to institutional risks. GIS, by its nature, provides an effective way to relate these factors geospatially.
A strong GIS capability within the institution is important for emergency response.
The need to relate the Cerro Grande fire to hazardous material locations and critical infrastructure was immediately evident, and offsite GIS facilities in Albuquer que and Santa Fe were essential in providing such information. The ever-changing nature of the emergency showed that GIS personnel should be experienced at solving unique and complex problems, have the flexibility to work in emergency situations, and have an under stand ing both of generic GIS systems and of local data sets.
Coordinated emergency plans among GIS providers are needed for effective operations under emergency conditions.
Lack of contingency plans for offsite GIS operations during the emergency delayed and complicated the acquisition, processing, and distribution of necessary data and maps. Contingency plans should include formally defined roles for GIS personnel. Likewise, emergency managers need to determine in advance which datasets are likely to be needed during a crisis and ensure their availability. Procedures are also needed to allow timely, safe re-entry by select employees during an extended evacuation in order for them to complete emergency preparations, including the removal of critical equipment, records, and data to safe locations.
Emergency plans should identify key equipment, software, and information that can be taken to a predetermined, alternate work location.
Such items include portable computers that have been loaded with GIS software and important data, necessary peripherals, contact information for key personnel, institutional credit cards, password-generating devices, and key reference materials. These are critical to the timely establishment of an operational GIS capability offsite. Emergency plans should also consider alternate sources for GIS staff.
Employees need several organizational methods to report their whereabouts and to receive authoritative information and instructions during an evacuation.
The methods should be adaptable to varied-scale (building, facility, town, and county) evacuations that occur during daytime, nighttime, or on weekends. The method of evacuation should take into account different types of hazard situations. Publicly released institutional information should be sufficiently detailed to allow employees to assess the accuracy of media reports, which sometimes over-emphasized damage or used unwarranted hyperbole.
Geospatial data should be complete, backed-up, and available during an emergency.
Access to information is imperative in a crisis, and effective use of GIS during an emergency may require information from many sources. Ideally, these data should be complete, accurate, authoritative, and documented with metadata, which was not always the case during this emergency. Data management procedures should therefore be coordinated among data users and providers to resolve such issues in advance of an emergency. To protect against large-scale disasters, backup copies of important or irreplaceable information should be stored at an entirely different area at the institution, as well as at a secure, off-site location. 9 7. GIS procedures must be adaptable to the unique needs and circumstances of the emergency.
Conditions may change quickly and radically during an emergency, which require GIS technology that is flexible enough to generate unique, rapid solutions. Employees may not be able to use the standard procedures of normal operations (procurement, for example), and managers may be faced with unexpected data needs. Personnel must therefore be flexible and highly innovative in order to adapt to the chaos and uncertainty that occur during emergencies. Consequently, it is important to make appropriate procedural adaptations for employees to understand not just how to perform certain tasks but why they are done in a certain fashion.
GIS communities internal and external to the organization need to more fully coordinate efforts.
At an organizational level, there are often issues of territoriality, duplication of effort, competition for resources, and a general reluctance to share data. 10 This is counter-productive during emergencies. It is important for management to have fostered good working relations prior to an emergency, appropriate division of effort and specialization, and a culture of willingness to share data, technical expertise, and capabilities among the in sti tution's GIS nodes. Such groundwork can be invaluable for mutual support and enhanced productivity. The assistance of outside GIS organizations was crucial in the Cerro Grande fire; it was important that prior relationships had been developed via the NMGIC and from user-level interactions.
9. Institutional GIS resources should be more fully integrated into institutional operations. GIS assets and resources typically operate independently and in isolation due to their project focus. To facilitate a coordinated approach to emergency management and other institutional needs, they should be more fully integrated into all levels of operations, including facility planning, risk and needs assessment, emergency planning and response, site security, environmental restoration, communications, facility operations, community outreach, and interagency interactions, as well as into programmatic research.
Key infrastructure information and geospatial data should reside in a centralized, institutionally controlled repository-a data warehouse that is easily available to emergency managers.
This helps avoid critical problems of dispersed and unavailable information, outdated or varying versions of key data, incompatible formats, nonstandard brands and types of storage media and software, uncertain or unknown quality and completeness of datasets, and lack of sufficiently descriptive metadata. An appropriate investment of resources must be provided to sustain a data warehouse.
gIs In emergency mAnAgement
As is typical in emergencies, the Cerro Grande wildfire revealed problems and inefficiencies that emergency and organizational managers and operations personnel had to resolve. Some issues were administrative, some were technical, and others related to the Laboratory's physical layout and infrastructure. Many issues were related to access and communication of information. A number of these issues led to the Laboratory's decision to build the new, larger, state-of-the-art EOC. In order to improve interagency communication, the EOC has been designed as a joint facility for use by LANL and Los Alamos County (police, fire, ambulance dispatch), with participation as needed by the neighboring pueblos, National Guard, state police, Red Cross, DOE, and New Mexico Emergency Management representatives.
The new facility addresses problems of computer network access and reliability by having its own server that automatically captures regular snapshots of the Laboratory's changing infrastructure from servers linked to it. This provides emergency managers an internal, up-to-date compilation of facilityrelated information and eliminates the reliance on uninterrupted access to numerous project-specific servers dispersed around the Laboratory. 11 The data mirror permits the creation of detailed maps for use by emergency personnel and is enhanced by the relay of digital information, maps, and images to field personnel by means of digital radio links. 5 The substantial enhancement of institutional GIS infrastructure achieved with CGRP funding includes the development of GISLab and its multi-terabyte servers, a geospatial data warehouse for institutional data hosted by Facility and Waste Operations Division, and the EOC's automated data mirror. Additional GIS staff was hired, helping to invigorate the GIS technical community. Communication and professional training within the Lab's GIS community has been enhanced so that managers and technical staff have a better understanding about the capabilities of GIS technology. The Chief Information Officer and proactive GIS users have promoted excellence in GIS operations, especially in regard to data standards and federally mandated metadata (information, such as caveats, about data).
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Managers have a new appreciation of the significant benefits of GIS technology for operational and emergency use, evident not only by closer internal coordination among GIS units at the Laboratory but also by establishment of steering committees and GIS user groups at LANL. Coordination between GIS staff at Los Alamos and Sandia has enhanced similar efforts at DOE headquarters and within the DOE complex of laboratories and facilities.
The growing maturity of GIS, together with lessons learned from the Cerro Grande wildfire, will lead to greater standardization and a better-integrated, coordinated approach to using this technology, including a clearer definition of the role of GIS in emergency management. GIS played a valuable role in the response to the Cerro Grande wildfire, and many lessons can be learned from the experience.
Such lessons can invigorate and enhance the use of this important technology for emergency management at all organizational levels.
